Scratching Below the Surface

What Are Drones?

The word “drone” comes from a word that means “to make noise”.  (And now drones try to be silent.)  An unmanned combat air vehicle, also known as a combat drone (or often simply drone), is armed.  No human is aboard (making it fuel efficient and trim), yet (for now) it remains under real-time human control.  If the drone’s human controller is actually located some distance away from where the drone is operating, this may cause latency (resulting in a reduced reaction time); furthermore, the controller’s field of vision and clarity of vision could stand to be improved.  However, overall, if tuned and used correctly, drones can save money and lives in combat situations.  And their size is constantly being reduced, which should increase their precision and versatility.  (Drone weaponry is shrinking to a soon-reached “5-pound missile the size of a loaf of French bread”, down from the 100-pound Hellfire missile in use today.)  Conceivably, in the near future, one could deliver a fatal package the size of a beetle to a politician, a military turncoat, or a suspected spy, all the while completely evading detection.  Drones are becoming more pervasive and effective all the time.  And they aren’t going away just because some government decides to disapprove of them.

There are also unarmed drones which, militarily, have many functions, most often involving surveillance.  There are a wide variety of drone shapes, sizes, configurations, and characteristics.  Historically, unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles were simple remotely piloted aircraft, but autonomous control is increasingly being employed.  They are often preferred for missions that are too “dull, dirty, or dangerous” for manned aircraft.  Used commercially, they raise privacy concerns (a danger unlikely to ever be completely eliminated).  Small unarmed drones can courier, search inside burning buildings, look for breaks in fences and barriers, seek stranded hikers, monitor traffic, and myriad other tasks useful to society.  Preventing collisions between drones and objects and dealing with other such out-of-control situations are things right now being worked out.

This discussion mainly centers around armed drones.

Who Has Drones?

Lots of countries have known operational armed drones: China has at least 3 types, including one that looks like a Reaper while behaving like a Predator; France has only one kind, based on the Israeli model; Germany’s single type is similar to France’s but modified; India has 3 variants of the Israeli model and two drone models of their own design.  Iran is known to have several types of drones; Ireland has a single type used in Irish Army duties; Israel has at least 5 variations of its proprietary model.  North Korea has “flying bombs”; Pakistan is testing two models (one purchased from Italy) and a third model “under development”.  Russia has the Israeli model; Taiwan is having academics develop one based on a US model; Turkey has a few unique types; and (finally), Italy, the UK, and the US all have Predators and Reapers.

Who Makes Drone Rules?

International laws of war govern conduct and define combatants.  In general, parties are to limit civilian deaths/injuries where possible by properly identifying targets.  A person should be assigned (and accept) accountability for the final decision to deploy.  The controller, who needs special training, may sometimes be a civilian, but he/she is nevertheless considered a combatant under the rules of war and MUST (be made to) understand the legal and moral ramifications of that status.

Who Trains Drone Controllers?

Apparently, to pilot a drone for posting to a US war zone, a pilot’s license is NOT required, merely about 5½ months of training, an above-average score on an aptitude test, a security clearance, medium strength, normal colour vision, US citizenship, and a clean record other than minor traffic violations.  (And no qualms about killing for the armed-drone flyers.  No special qualifications for that were mentioned.)  Three universities in the US (Kansas, North Dakota, Florida) offer bachelor’s degrees for would-be pilots for (generic) remotely-piloted aircraft.  This includes 13 credits in engineering, so students can get an overview of the vehicles’ complete systems.  Though university courses are presumably for the unarmed civilian drones, some graduates are hired by the US CIA for posting overseas.  I could find no information for drone piloting training for other countries.

What Needs to Happen?

Drones appear to have wide public support in the US, but the sentiment generally favours them being controlled by the military, not the CIA, and NOT being used on American citizens abroad.  Further, a large majority of Americans feel that armed drones should NEVER be used on US citizens at home.  (Of course, you could also say, “Shooting people with handguns has wide public support, especially if it’s the military, not the CIA, and if they aren’t targeting American citizens either at home or abroad.”  What distinguishes armed drones from all the other ways governments use lethal force?)  Drones need to be better at taking out an enemy’s own robotic drones.  To do that, they must be able to recognise, track, and disable them.  (It may soon to be “drone versus drone” time).  Let’s face it: the drone genie is out of the bottle.  Technology makes drones feasible, and since they’re advantageous for a wide range of purposes, it’s unquestionable that they’ll continue to be a factor on the world stage.  The question is not IF drones should be used, but HOW BEST can they be used?
 

The Case for Using Drones

In war zones, if drones aren’t used, combatants may need rooting out through full-fledged ground campaigns, likely killing and displacing more civilians than drone-use.  (Areas where militants hide may not be easy terrain.)  Bringing development and education into those difficult-to-access areas could maybe cure extremism, but there may still be a need to weed out (meaning kill off) the already-entrenched militants for a realistic chance that any development process could succeed.  The legality under international law of various types of drone use (mainly involving target choice) needs to be firmly established.  (Can drones be unleashed in any country by any other country if certain parameters are exceeded and certain interim measures fail?  Can we rationally distinguish between companies, countries, and cults?)

Drones are cheap and versatile: they conserve resources (to the extent they’re reliably used) — but any conflicts in which they’re involved should be viewed by most impartial observers as unavoidable and justified.  The US has used drones to kill suspected terrorists in both Pakistan and Yemen.  Did Pakistan ask the US for help?  (Apparently.)  Did Yemen?  (Perhaps unofficially.  There are conflicting and conflicted reports about this.)  Are drone strikes ever used as bartered favours?  (How would anyone know?)  Indications that this has sometimes happened may appear over time, but to do so, records containing drone use rationale must eventually be revealed (more about this later).  The use of military force against targets in a country who has neither asked for help nor is at war with the invader is troubling.  (Would the US not have used deadly force in Yemen except via unmanned armed drones?  I don’t know.  Drones are easier/cheaper/better for some purposes, but it’s a marginal improvement, not a paradigm shift.)

Drones can easily traverse impassable terrain; they refuel less often than manned jets.  Training drone controllers is faster and significantly cheaper than training pilots.  Future drones may be able to avoid radar detection and gain hyper-maneuverability.  They’re feared by terrorists because they’re virtually invisible and very quiet.  US Attorney General Eric Holder claims certain conditions must be met for a target to be drone-killed: he/she must be “a senior operational leader of al-Qaida or associates”, planning an attack against the US (though clear evidence that a specific attack on US persons or interests is planned for the immediate future is NOT required), located in a country that has given the US permission to strike, and be infeasible to be captured (in other words, considered “imminent threat”).  The strike must be conducted according to “law of war principles.”  Some members of the Pakistani military actively (but privately) support US drone-use.  However, Pakistan has recently reversed their stance and say they no longer allow US drone strikes.

There are cases when countries should go to war but didn’t, such as the humanitarian situation in Rwanda.  Drones could have enabled and encouraged such an operation by reducing the financial and political cost to the US or other humanitarian interventionists.  Thus, drones appear able to improve a country’s ability to behave justly.  Every action taken regarding drones is recorded.  For a difficult decision operators can bring other people into the room for further opinions before pulling any trigger.  This means there is more room for checks and oversights with drone use.  If using a drone averts risk to a pilot without compromising an operation, countries may have a duty to use drones.  Helicopter pilots who looks down and think someone has a surface-to-air missile may shoot first and figure it out later because their lives are in danger; with drones, they can afford to make sure the targets are combatants before engaging.  From the perspective of troops, any technology that allows fulfillment of the mission without risking their own lives is an ethical non-issue.  The subjects that matter in every situation are: When is “collateral damage” acceptable?  How much is acceptable?  Are the targets military or are they extra-legal?  These are all questions about policy and law, not technology.

The first use of a drone in a combat mission was by Iran during the Iran-Iraq war.  Drones evolved from the development of guided munitions over a course of several decades.

Is an Invaded Country’s Sovereignty Violated by an Invading Country’s Drones?

If anything, the actual violation of sovereignty is being carried out by militants rather than drones — drones helped Pakistan establish sovereignty rather than violating it.  Drone attacks are aimed at killing militants in a targeted manner compared to suicide blasts conducted by those militants to kill innocents indiscriminately.  More than 35,000 people in Pakistan have died due to religious terrorism.  Drones have been much maligned but remain one of the least bad alternatives.  The US public’s vexation over the morality and legality of a drone war has produced confused debate.  By what right does the US president order killing by drone of enemies abroad?  The answer given under the laws of war is imminent threat (self-defense) and affiliation with al-Qaida.  Apparently Osama bin Laden declared war on the US in 1996; since he apparently was speaking for al-Qaida, its members were thereafter considered legitimate targets.  Anwar al-Aulaqi was apparently a self-declared al-Qaida member and thus an enemy combatant.  Once he “took up arms” against the US, he forfeited his privileges of citizenship.  (Notwithstanding the foregoing, Article III Section 3 of the US Constitution specifically states: “Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort.  No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.  The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason.”  However, al Aulaqi was not accused of treason — if he had been, he couldn’t have been killed as an enemy combatant on a “technical” battlefield.)  Al Aulaqi’s death was not the first of an American citizen by a drone, by the way; in 2002, US citizen Kemal Darwish was one of 6 men killed by a drone strike outside a war zone, in Yemen.  I see the difference between a US citizen being accused of treason, labelled a traitor, tried, and executed and in him instead being called an enemy combatant, and executed on the “battlefield” as hugely important, though not one related to drones per se except that being killed by a US armed drone today means being killed by the CIA, not the military.

Who Has Authority to Oversee Life-and-Death Drone Targeting?

In war, the ultimate authority is always the commander-in-chief and those in the lawful chain of command to whom he has delegated such authority.  For those who believe the war on terror is not war but law enforcement, this does not constitute a compelling reason.  That al Aulaqi (or bin Laden, or indeed, any single al Qaida fighter or agent) should be handled in a law enforcement context can be rational.  But an armed assault by a hundred trained fighters using military-grade weapons (mortars, machine guns, grenades) on an army base in Afghanistan is dealt with in a military context.  Where is the line drawn?  This, too, is an important question.

What Is the Future for Unarmed Drones?

While most jobs flying drones currently are military-related, universities and colleges expect that to change by 2015, when the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is due to release regulations for unmanned aircraft in domestic airspace.  Once those regulations are in place, the FAA predicts that 10,000 commercial drones will be operating in the US within 5 years.  Many community colleges offer training for remote pilots.  Some aviation industry analysts predict drones will eventually come to dominate the US skies in terms of jobs.  358 public institutions, including 14 universities and colleges, have permits from the FAA to fly unmanned aircraft, many of which were issued so that programmes to train future drone pilots could be undertaken.  Possible applications for unarmed drones: monitoring livestock and oil pipelines, spotting animal poachers (Google recently donated US$5 million to advance this programme in Africa and Asia), tracking down criminals fleeing crime scenes, and looking for people inside burning buildings to name but a few.  As of now rules for pilot qualification are set by the employer, but that may change.
 

What Is the Case Against Drone Use?

The arguments put forth against drone warfare fall into two main categories: Are drones ethically a worse technology that manned aircraft?  Is the use of drones extra-judicially illegal (or should it be)?

Regarding Drone Technology

Is better technology really the answer?  Inevitable proliferation will place drone technology in the hands of all states (the “universality formula”), some of which won’t follow the rules.  Even with technology, the US failed to achieve core objectives in either Iraq or Afghanistan.  Iraq isn’t a stable, pro-American democracy (if anything, it tilts toward Iran).  Nor was the Taliban defeated and a stable democracy created in Afghanistan.  Technological wizardry doesn’t always translate into strategic success.  (Would just avoiding war work better?  Probably.  But where is the magical plan to bring that about?)

Will countries transition to methods of aggression that rely heavily on remotely-operated armed drones?  (Their use is up up 700% under Obama to where now they constitute up to 10% of overall munitions deployed — and not by the military but by civilians working for the CIA.)  People who order assaults may be increasingly alienated from the process of moral deliberation surrounding the premeditated killing of others.  (But is that somehow less of an issue with cruise missiles or high-altitude bombing?)  Many who are against drones claim they create more militants than they kill.  The perception of drone strikes amongst Pakistanis is perpetuated over the Pakistani media, claiming they kill civilians indiscriminately.  (Would Pakistanis view the US more favourably if they used artillery or bombers instead of drones?  Very unlikely.)  In 2011, a Pew Research Center poll found only 12% of Pakistanis view the US favourably.  A more recent poll saw that figure drop to 4%.  Additionally, the fact that drone attacks are secretive (even after the fact) exacerbates public anger and suspicion.  If they were seen as just, acceptance would be higher.

US warfare evolved from professional warriors (in the post-Vietnam era when soldiers were no longer drafted but paid volunteers) to the mercenary and outsourced war after 9/11 (when for-profit industrial complexes carry out military and intelligence responsibilities in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere).  Now, the CIA has transitioned from being purely an intelligence agency to being more of a covert military force with their own unmanned air force.  Today US authorities use the term “bugsplat” to refer to humans killed by drone missiles, a term also used in children’s computer games.  Risk-free remote killing degrades traditional conceptions of valour.

Regarding Drone Ethics and Procedures

Many disputes seem to come down to whether one starts from the premise that the US is legitimately at war (or not).  The Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) was passed by Congress, signed by the President, and upheld by the Supreme Court — but it doesn’t quite work the way other declarations of war have in the past.  The arguments used to justify the powers the US president claims could be used to later assume even more expansive ones — perhaps even to claim the right to kill anyone on the planet, at any time, with no legal process or concern for the lives of bystanders killed in the operation.  (Perhaps his power will one day extend to the rest of the solar system — and, when possible, will move back and forward in time in order to kill some folks already dead or else not born yet.)  While there are some limits on the authority as set out, they are elastic, vaguely defined, and manipulable.  While accepting that “there will clearly be circumstances in which the president has the authority to use lethal force” against Americans who take up arms against the country, a group of US senators has written that, “It is vitally important … for Congress and the American public to have a full understanding of how the executive branch interprets the limits and boundaries of this authority.”  Others have an issue with the idea of “American exceptionalism.”  This philosophy is pervasive and subtle.  It starts in school, is echoed in church, and encouraged by political leaders and the entertainment industry.  It’s difficult, some say, to reason with people that in some way believe they’re special people with a special destiny to lead the world.

Drones significantly increase the executive branch’s ability to wage a clandestine war.  CIA powers to carry out drone attacks in Pakistan and Yemen, particularly in ungoverned tribal areas, are unchecked by US legislative and judicial branches.  While drones often circle a target for hours before striking (resulting in fewer civilian casualties than from manned attacks), the attack is generally more likely to have actually taken place, because it is now easier and less risky.  Detachment from a defined war-zone is a significant ethical issue as this may lead to combat-spread.  The drone wars in Pakistan and Yemen are increasingly targeting low-level militants who don’t actually pose a direct threat to the United States and contribute to a “perception of American arrogance.”  Perhaps a modern version of a WANTED: DEAD OR ALIVE notice could be publicly circulated, listing particulars, allowing named individuals the chance to turn themselves in (or hire attorneys) rather than wait for drones to find them.

Drones may make military activity more likely as they’re cheaper and less likely to involve domestic troop injuries or deaths.  (This will apply to all countries with drones.)  Their stealth makes drones less accountable and allows for activity far from any battlefield and in countries with which the invaders are not at war.  Drones could be corporately (or even privately) owned.  Long-term, they may decrease human well-being, particularly if constant surveillance becomes the norm.  In a time when the US spends $1 trillion a year on security, is that even sustainable?  Is it in America’s long-term interest to be waging war against a self-renewing insurgency inside a country about which Washington has at best a hazy understanding?

Part of the reason an executive exists is to make those decisions that need to be done quickly.  Secrecy here does not mean a lack of transparency — it refers to deliberations compatible with brisk, decisive choices.  (This was more true in 18th century when travel was burdensome.)  Having a single executive allows for accountability, especially after the fact: no passing the blame as there might be with an executive council.  But someone needs to be able to render judgement on those activities after the fact.  There needs to be a system of post-facto accountability.  More transparency by the executive branch would not interfere with decision-making.  The lawyer or “informed person” who signed off on the killing would submit a dossier to, perhaps, a special panel, who would then review the decision chain and determine if the government had substantively met its own criteria.  The panel would release to Congress and the public redacted versions of decisions.  If it found that the president was using powers indiscriminately, something could (eventually) be done about it.

An official with the US Federal Aviation Administration has stated that no armed drones will be permitted in US airspace, but acknowledges that drones could, for example, be equipped with weapons when monitoring the US-Mexico border because that’s outside FAA jurisdiction.  One day, will the federal government assassinate Americans on US soil?  It’s almost impossible to imagine what drone technology will look like in 5 or 10 years.  As the technology for arming drones spreads around the world, it will be impossible to control the use of unmanned, missile-firing aircraft.  It will be possible without a great deal of intelligence to do something with a drone that is impossible to accomplish with a high-powered rifle or a truck full of explosives.

In summary:

• The conflict in Yemen, Pakistan, and elsewhere (regardless of the weapon systems used) is legally and morally questionable.
• The targeting of US citizens abroad — by any weapon system — is legally and morally questionable.
• The use of autonomous drones — when it arises — will be legally and morally questionable.
• Drones are an amazing tool, and so useful that they’ll be developed by pretty much everyone, no matter what.
• Drones (armed and unarmed) are exceptional tools for military conflicts, and can reduce costs, casualties, and — at least per strike — collateral damage.
• In fact, drones are so amazing that they may make war almost too attractive.  If so, this is morally questionable (although it won’t stop their adoption).

Can the income tax alone fund the US government?  Probably not.  A growing economy could reduce the deficit to 2.4% of GDP by 2015, but by 2023 it’ll be back to 3.8% (and worsening).  (77 million aging baby boomers need medical care.)  Income tax’s ever-narrowing base (as boomers move from taxpayers to benefit receivers) can’t support those spending demands.  With the top tax rate now over 40% (all things considered) increasing income taxes even further will likely cause diminishing (rather than increasing) amounts to collected.

Income tax laws contain subsidies (such as home mortgage interest, employer-sponsored health insurance, credit for state and local taxes paid, charitable contributions).  No politician wants his/her name associated with the loss from any cherished deduction.  The government could spend less (an intractable problem in itself) or else the US could initiate a consumption tax.  It could start low — say 2%.  NZ has a goods and services tax, which is built into the price.  This means the price on the shelf tag or on the bill left by your server is the price you pay at checkout.  After a while, GST becomes essentially invisible.

Unless interest rates rise (precipitating fiscal crisis), nothing is likely to be done about taxes anytime soon.  I think this is a mistake because the current situation is unlikely to endure.  Increasing the tax credit for dependents could encourage more future taxpayers to be born, but that’s a rather long-term solution.  Social security actuaries say small changes in benefits can significantly extend the programme’s solvency.  Spending will grow (due to demographics, inflation, and the government).  Question is, will taxes to keep up?  Or will new spending be financed by taking on even more debt?  If debt finances spending, that’ll probably be bad in the long run.  But if taxes can keep up, there’s a chance of a long-term positive outcome as taxes tend to grow faster than nominal GDP.  If the government keeps spending in line with GDP growth + inflation (or, even better, in line with spending alone), the deficit could be maybe fixed.  The government’s financial crisis would vanish the moment it committed to just not increasing spending more than inflation.  (But that’ll never happen.)

In summary:

Boomers are retiring; income taxes won’t be suffucient to run the US government without major cuts and/or consumption taxes.  There’s no magic.  You either need very comprehensive (as in sweeping privatization) of Medicare, or else a comsumption tax.  Democrats (and no few Republicans) would sooner die than support the former, and NOBODY in the US will support the latter.

As to whether social security and medicare-type investments are good ones for the government to make, the following is condensed from How Capitalism Creates the Welfare State:

The turbulence of a growing wealth-creating free market disrupts traditional ways of life.  People move around; their choices of love-and-sex partners multiply; families disaggregate to use their own virtual devices; grandparents are transferred to assisted living; second marriages are as familiar as first ones; whole industries (and all the learned skills that went with that) just disappear overnight.  Capitalism is anti-conservative, a disruptive force throughout human society, changing the world more in the past 300 years than anything did in the 200,000 years before that.  This is why the welfare state emerged — the cruelty of the market, the way it dispenses brutally with inefficiency (meaning neighbours’, relatives’, colleagues’, spouses’, and our own jobs), the manner in which it encourages constant travel and communication: these aren’t the best ways to strengthen existing social norms, buttress families, allow civil society to do as it once did, which was to take care of people within family units according to generational justice and respect.  That kind of social order is inimical to capitalism.  So 19th- and 20th-century leaders (conservatives as well as liberals) attached a safety net to the constantly shifting web of human demand and supply — for humane reasons, yes, but also because they realised that unless capitalism has collective cushioning, it will soon fall prey to revolutionary movements.  This safety net was created to save capitalism from itself and it is still needed for that.  It urges compassion toward victims of economic and social change and at least a cursory understanding of their bewilderment.